President Hamid Karzai recently called upon Taliban leaders Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to consider the prospect of peace talks with the Afghan Government. Will this strategy work? Can there be an understanding with the Taliban culminating in an early peace?
Aid organizations and analysts suggest that peace talks with the outlawed Taliban may provide the Afghan Government and the international Coalition the opportunity to explore new avenues for tackling the insurgency.
Unfortunately, hoping the peace talks to put an end to an intensifying insurgency and subsequently accommodate the Taliban within the framework of a Western-style (and backed) democratic government is misguided at best. Peace talks with the Taliban are futile and dangerous.
First and foremost, they will undermine the NATO efforts and progress of the past six years. Peace talks could also risk a split between President Karzai and his Western allies, destabilizing the Afghan state further.
Serious negotiations can only be considered when a ceasefire exists on the ground. Karzai's appeals for peace talks falter on a fundamental paradox. How can frank and meaningful talks be held when the Coalition Forces are engaged in combating Taliban/al Qaeda insurgents? A ceasefire in the foreseeable future is extremely remote.
Given the nature of the Taliban-al Qaeda nexus, the United States will not stand for it. Across the divide, the burden of responsibility is on the Taliban to make their vision compatible with those of the Afghan Government and the international community.
From the Taliban's perspective, however, peace talks held on conditions that they renounce violence and accept NATO occupation is simply unacceptable.
Additionally, the Taliban's relationship with al Qaeda is extremely intricate and deep-seated, with financial, drug and weapons transactions between them sustaining much of the insurgency's verve. The possibility of peace talks helping drive an ideological or strategic wedge between the above-mentioned groups is negligible, certainly not while Afghanistan maintains a significant foreign presence on its soil. Consequently, attempting to lure the Taliban into acquiescing to calls for reconciliation with promises of ministerial-level seats/official posts will not bear fruit.
Moving on, President Karzai has repeatedly highlighted the ongoing reconciliation process taking place in the country, and efforts to bring into the fold the 'moderate' Taliban who are not part of al Qaeda or other terrorist networks.
To begin with, identifying moderates is tricky amidst the mess and confusion. Many officials and scholars dismiss the notion of the 'moderate' Taliban as a myth. Nonetheless, accommodating moderates in mainstream politics is definitely a viable option. Most of the so-called moderates, however, have already been co-opted into the state machinery, leaving only the hard-liners to fight the fight.
These hardliners have no incentive to relinquish control over their fiefdoms to a unified, democratic national government. But can the mid-level Taliban and foot soldiers be swayed? The 'knee-jerk' reactions by states involved in military operations in Afghanistan - including skewed drug-control policies, indiscriminate use of air-power resulting in civilian casualties - threaten to further alienate an increasingly disenchanted populace.
Such alienation may well lead the deprived and disillusioned into the arms of Taliban recruiters. However, the majority of rank-and-file Taliban soldiers are not those who are bent with a radical anti-state ideology, but ordinary poverty-stricken individuals desperately seeking ways to feed their families.
A significant number of these fighters do not rule out laying down their weapons in exchange for being included in potential peace talks. The government's (and international community's) strategy should therefore be a concerted effort aimed at providing basic services and income-generating opportunities to the needy populace.
The idea is to thwart the Taliban's recruiting appeal by alleviating the sufferings of the locals. Winning the 'Hearts and Minds' of the local populace is the foremost manifestation of such a strategy. Unfortunately, both the State and the international community have failed to successfully implement this strategy, obliging Karzai to appeal for peace talks.
The writer is Research Officer, IPCS
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