NEW YORK: A great deal of inaccuracy and misinformation surrounds the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) draft waiver exemption for India, which is a key part of the process of operationalizing the entry of India as a full-member in the global nuclear mainstream, according to the US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC).
Public statements like those made by the Arms Control Association (ACA) last week contribute to a misrepresentation of the true circumstances that surround India’s nuclear program and its record as a responsible steward of nuclear technology, adding to the confusion, the USINPAC says. ACA in a media advisory stated, "… any India-specific exemption from NSG guidelines would erode the credibility of the NSG’s efforts to ensure that access to peaceful nuclear trade and technology is available only to those states that meet global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament standards."
"The US-India nuclear deal, far from eroding the credibility of the global non-proliferation regime, strengthens it by bringing India into the fold, said Sanjay Puri, Chairman of USINPAC. "This agreement, exemplified by the NSG waiver, acknowledges that India is a large democracy that respects the rule of law and has had an impeccable record of not proliferating nuclear technology beyond its borders.
To illustrate India’s responsible behavior as a steward of nuclear material, the Tarapur facility was under safeguards for 30 years as per a US-India-IAEA agreement. When this agreement expired, India voluntarily established a new agreement with the IAEA to continue the safeguards.
The Tarapur agreement also stipulated that the US would take back the spent fuel from India. After the end of the Tarapur contract, India was free to re-process that fuel; instead, it chose to place it under safeguards." ACA also said, "The supply of foreign nuclear fuel to India’s civil nuclear sector would also free up India’s limited fuel supplies for use in its military production sector and allow India to increase its production of fissile material for nuclear weapon." This line of thinking assumes every state is at risk of automatically wanting to produce as many nuclear weapons as it can," said Puri.